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Abstract 
 
Using a legal history methodology, this paper examines existing marine 
renewable energy law and policy in Nova Scotia with a focus on its 
application in the Bay of Fundy.  This paper critically assesses the current 
approach to coastal management in light of recent recommendations 
summarized in the Fournier report. This paper argues that, despite clear 
calls to develop integrated ocean management and marine spatial planning 
in policies and regulations, Canada and Nova Scotia have failed to do so 
because of unclear federal-provincial boundaries. Ambiguous domestic 
borders in the Bay of Fundy have been at the source of an overly cautious, 
issue-driven and jurisdictionally uncertain approach to ocean governance 
which has permeated marine renewable energy law. This approach is 
unsuited for today’s environmental objectives and does not hold promise 
for goals to reconcile competing interests in increasingly industrialised 
waters. Through a historical account of shifting limits in the Bay of Fundy, 
this paper connects existing doubts and frictions associated with domestic 
offshore boundaries to ineffective coastal management in an attempt to 
renew interest in federal-provincial maritime delimitation.  
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was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada 
(SSHRC), the Canadian Energy Law Foundation and the University of Ottawa. The author 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 It is now widely acknowledged that managing and regulating coastal 
activities in a vacuum does not serve environmental and social interests.2 
Integrated ocean management and marine spatial planning have surfaced 
as guiding concepts for coastal governance from this widespread 
recognition. However, despite clear references to integrated ocean 
management within the Oceans Act3, and related regional action plans,4 
such type of management remains an aspiration for the marine renewable 
energy sector in Nova Scotia. The provincial Marine Renewable-energy 
Act5 (hereinafter “the Act”) follows a narrow approach to coastal 
regulation and stays shy of addressing and preventing potential conflicts 
of use in marine areas. Despite clear calls to include marine spatial 
planning and other inclusive management tools within marine renewable 
energy law and policy,6 why have recent regulatory developments stayed 
clear of this recommendation? 
 Using a legal history methodology, I argue that persisting ambiguity 
on federal-provincial boundaries in the Bay of Fundy has silenced the issue 
of regulatory jurisdiction and contributed to a very near-sighted 
framework for the tidal energy sector in Nova Scotia. In an effort to avoid 
jurisdictional confrontation, the Government of Nova Scotia has failed to 
address coastal planning and management in an inclusive and wholesome 
manner. Enacted legislation is specifically tailored to the immediate needs 
of the tidal energy industry. This is reflective of a “tippy-toe” approach or, 
as some have called it, an issue-driven practice inconsistent with the 
foundations of pre-emptive spatial planning and integrated ocean 
management.7   
 At the very core, the issue of jurisdiction is a constitutional debate. 
This has been recalled during some of the most important milestone 
                                            
 2.  Sylvie Guénette & Jackie Alder, Lessons from Marine Protected Areas and 
Integrated Ocean Management Initiatives in Canada, 35 COASTAL MANAGEMENT 51−78, 
51 (2007). 
 3.  Oceans Act, S.C. 1996, c 31 (Can).  
 4.  Fisheries & Oceans Canada, Regional Oceans Plan - Maritime Region: 
Background and Program Description (Dartmouth, NS: Bedford Institute of 
Oceanography, 2014).  
 5.  Marine Renewable-energy Act, S.N.S. 2015, c 32 (Can.). 
 6.  Robert O. Fournier, Marine Renewable Energy Legislation: A Consultative 
Process, Halifax: Report to the Government of Nova Scotia (2011), at 26. 
 7.  Sue Nichols & David Monahan, Fuzzy Boundaries in a Sea of Uncertainty: 
Canada’s Offshore Boundaries in The Coastal Cadastre - Onland, Offshore - Proceedings 
of the New Zealand Institute of Surveyors Annual Meeting (Bay of Islands, NZ: 1999), at 
10.   
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moments in Canadian offshore resource administration history.8 Section 
92A of the Constitution Act, 18679 sets out that “In each province, the 
legislature may exclusively make laws in relation to . . . development, 
conservation and management of sites and facilities in the province for the 
generation and production of electrical energy.”10 Determining whether 
the Bay of Fundy is in the provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, 
in whole or in part, is therefore important.11 However, historical evidence 
suggests that offshore jurisdiction has been a taboo subject in Canada for 
some time. Without attempting to resolve the thorny issue of domestic 
jurisdiction, this paper examines the current legal framework and focuses 
on inconsistent jurisdictional discourses to reveal the influence of unclear 
borders on offshore governance in the Bay of Fundy. 
 Increased awareness on the correlation between territorial ambiguity 
and a regulatory approach that fails to address competing interests in a 
reconciling fashion might just be what it takes to renew a faded interest in 
domestic maritime boundaries. Some have argued that “[o]wing to the 
different and sometimes unique historical development of the Canadian 
provinces from their colonial days, it is doubtful if this matter [of 
jurisdiction of offshore resources] will be finally determined until each 
province has had its day in court.”12 Others have instead put forth that, in 
a Canadian context, these conflicts are more likely to be resolved through 
political rather than judicial means.13 Whether inside or outside a 
courtroom, the issue of domestic boundaries in the Bay of Fundy is one 
that needs fixing. Drawing federal-provincial borders is necessary for a 
more sustainable approach to marine and coastal management. 
                                            
 8.  When federal Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau announced the establishment 
of resource administration lines, the Member of Parliament for the riding of Lotbinière 
stated that “it would be both in the interest of the federal government and the provinces to 
meet and define clearly the jurisdiction of the governments, on the federal and provincial 
level, because, in the final analysis it concerns the very essence of the B.N.A. Act.” House 
of Commons Debates, 28th Parl, 1st Sess, No 3 (2 December 1968), at 3344 (André Fortin). 
 9.  Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c 3, § 7 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1895, 
Appendix ǁ, no 5 (Can.). 
 10.  Meinhard Doelle et al., Tidal Energy: Governance Options for NS: Final Report, 
Halifax: Marine & Environmental Law Institute at Dalhousie University (2006), at 8 
(emphasis added). 
 11.  Id. at 8−9. 
 12.  John B. Ballem, “Oil and Gas and the Canadian Constitution on Land and Under 
the Sea” in The Constitution and the Future of Canada: Special Lectures of the Law Society 
of Upper Canada (Toronto: R. De Boo, 1978), at 270.  
 13.  Roderick Logan, Mineral Resource Administration Lines, 23 THE PROFESSIONAL 
GEOGRAPHER  160−163, 161 (1971). 
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 Part II of this paper first discusses the recommendations set out in the 
Fournier report on marine renewable energy legislation. It then examines 
failed policy attempts to follow Fournier’s advice on integrated ocean 
management and marine spatial planning while emphasizing an apparent 
connection between such failure and jurisdictional uncertainty. Part II 
concludes with a legislative history of the Marine Renewable-energy Act, 
illustrating a clear dismissal of integrated management principles. Part III 
first traces the colonial boundary history in the Bay of Fundy and then 
focuses on the post-Confederation discourse that brought distortions to a 
previously straightforward delimitation. It also explores the emergence of 
mineral resource administrative lines and their contributions to the 
domestic geopolitical landscape. Lastly, Part III highlights a regulatory 
pattern that resulted from jurisdictional uncertainty, a pattern in tune with 
recent legal and policy developments in the marine renewable sector.  
II. THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK: CONTRASTING EXPECTATIONS WITH 
REALITY  
A. The Fournier Report: A Guide to Future Legislation 
 When Nova Scotia’s former Minister of Energy presented the Marine 
Renewable-energy Act as an Act that “follow[ed] through on Dr. Bob 
Fournier's recommendations,”14 one had reason to believe that the Act 
incorporated at least some reference to marine spatial planning. Robert 
Fournier’s report, “Marine renewable energy legislation: a consultative 
approach,” stressed the benefits of marine spatial planning on multiple 
occasions. The report was commissioned by the Government of Nova 
Scotia in 2010 at a time when it wished to obtain further clarity on what to 
include in future marine renewable energy law. Despite the report’s 
insistence on marine planning, the overall idea behind this spatial approach 
to offshore governance remained notoriously absent from the adopted 
legal and policy framework.   
 In his report, Fournier pointed to integrated coastal management and 
marine spatial planning as tools to balance competing interests at sea, 
emphasizing the popularity of these tools in marine renewable energy law 
abroad.15 He noted existing conflicts between several coastal activities and 
environmental interests, and argued that “[m]arine renewable energy 
represents but one more potential usage that carries with it potential 
                                            
 14.  Nova Scotia, Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 62nd Assembly, No. 2 (7 May 
2015), at 5150, 5152 (Hon Michel Samson). 
 15.  Fournier, supra note 6, at 5. 
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benefits and conflicts.”16 Fournier saw possible spatial conflicts with the 
aquaculture sector and added that the provincial Fisheries and Coastal 
Resources Act17 contained no provision dealing with activity overlap.18 
The Marine Renewable-energy Act later addressed this issue in a rather 
uncompromising manner, simply amending the Fisheries and Coastal 
Resources Act to grant precedence to Marine Renewable Electricity 
Areas.19 In his report, Fournier had instead proposed developing a marine 
spatial plan to prevent activity conflict between the aquaculture sector and 
the marine renewable sector.20 
 The report encouraged Nova Scotia’s Department of Energy to “play 
a leadership role in advancing [integrated ocean management] in parallel 
with the development of the [marine renewable energy] sector.”21 
Recommendation 10 of the report specifically addressed the “lack of 
clarity regarding jurisdictional responsibilities” in the Bay of Fundy and 
pushed the provincial Department of Energy to negotiate with Fisheries 
and Oceans Canada to increase Nova Scotia’s regulatory powers for the 
management of the bay.22 Fournier also recommended that “the 
Department of Energy . . . actively embrace and advance the concept and 
practice of Marine Spatial Planning.”23 He warned against developing 
premature legislation without a prior “clearly delineated plan.”24 
Fournier’s motives to issue such a warning were that Nova Scotia did not 
have a clear vision of what marine energy industries could look like in the 
future.25 Legislation without a prior plan “would be based on tenuous 
assumptions regarding the stability or volatility of the energy, economic, 
social, financial and technological sectors.”26 Although a plan for marine 
renewable energy was eventually developed in 2012 by the Government 
of Nova Scotia, its shortcomings are discussed in the section below.  
 Fournier encouraged the launch of a coastal strategy before “any 
serious renewable energy activities” took place in the Bay of Fundy.27 The 
coastal strategy would protect different stakeholders, including marine 
                                            
 16.  Id. at 31. 
 17.  Fisheries and Coastal Resources Act, S.N.S. 1996, c 25 (Can.).  
 18.  Fournier, supra note 6, at 20. 
 19.  Marine Renewable-energy Act, S.N.S. 2015, c 32, § 73 (Can.).  
 20.  Fournier, supra note 6, at 20.   
 21.  Id. at 5.   
 22.  Id. at 34.  
 23.  Id.  
 24.  Id. at 24. 
 25.  Id.  
 26.  Id. at 25. 
 27.  Id. at 32. 
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renewable energy developers, and offer greater predictability in terms of 
the allocation of ocean space.28 Fournier insisted, “[o]nce again we draw 
attention to the need for a Coastal Plan and especially the valuable subset 
known as Marine Spatial Planning.”29 At the time the report was issued, 
Fournier contemplated delays in implementing a coastal strategy and 
foresaw an activity decline for the Provincial Oceans Network, the leading 
cross-sectoral platform for coastal activities.30  His comments turned to 
prophecy; the Provincial Oceans Network became minimally active and a 
comprehensive coastal strategy embracing marine spatial planning 
remains to be seen.31   
B. A Missing Coastal Strategy 
 In 2015, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation published a news 
piece in which it referred to “a coastal strategy that could have been.”32 
The expression well captured Nova Scotia’s failed attempt to adopt a 
comprehensive provincial strategy for its coastal areas. The events leading 
up to the current void are worth noting.  
 In 2008, a couple of years prior to the Fournier report, the 
Government of Nova Scotia established a Coastal Management 
Framework.33 One of the short-term objectives of the framework was to 
clarify federal and provincial roles and responsibilities concerning coastal 
management.34 This short-term objective visibly recognized jurisdictional 
ambiguity between both levels of government although it did not explicitly 
refer to jurisdiction per se. Still within the Coastal Management 
Framework, the Government of Nova Scotia laid out strategic activities to 
reach a better understanding of such roles and responsibilities. These 
activities included establishing a Sustainable Coastal Development 
Strategy and signing a Memorandum of Understanding with the 
Government of Canada.35  
                                            
 28.  Id. at 32. 
 29.  Id. at 60. 
 30.  Id. at 32. 
 31.  The last updates of the Provincial Oceans Network concern the Draft Coastal 
Strategy later abandoned. 
 32.  David Irish, Nova Scotia Urged to Develop Unified Coastal Erosion Plan, CBC 
News (Dec. 3, 2015), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/ns-lack-of-coastal-
management-1.3346071 [https://perma.cc/BRJ5-B7Q4]. 
 33.  Nova Scotia, “Coastal Management Framework” (2009).  
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
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 Ironically, the Memorandum signed in 2011 read that nothing in the 
agreement would “be construed to be prejudicial to the interests of the 
Parties concerning ownership or jurisdiction of coastal and marine areas, 
submerged Crown lands and the seabed.”36 The Memorandum specifically 
addressed the need to focus on integrated ocean management and planning 
within the Bay of Fundy area,37 but the clause was significantly hampered 
by the fact that the parties agreed “to clarify the roles and responsibilities 
of the federal and provincial departments” at a later stage.38 The 
Memorandum, instead of setting straight the respective responsibilities of 
each government, as was originally agreed in the Coastal Management 
Framework, dismissed jurisdiction-based arguments and postponed 
further clarification of government roles.  
 As per the terms of the Coastal Management Framework, the 
Government of Nova Scotia also undertook the task of creating a Coastal 
Strategy in 2011. However, the strategy never made it past the draft 
stage.39 In early 2012, while the process was still ongoing, Nova Scotia’s 
House of Assembly Committee on Resources discussed the draft strategy 
at length. Several interventions made clear that federal-provincial conflicts 
and ambiguities in the near-shore areas existed. Mr. Greg Roach, of the 
Nova Scotia Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture, stated that the 
federal Oceans Act’s far-reaching scope regarding coastal management 
demanded provincial intervention: 
we were saying, just a second, that’s getting very close to the 
provincial domain. . . . [W]hen you get into the coastal zone where 
all the users interact, there is a lot more material to start to work 
on there, but it was, we believed, largely a provincial domain. 
Then we said, okay, we’ve got to get our own house in order as 
far as a coastal plan, coastal strategy, whatever you wish.40 
The coastal zone coordinator then argued that talks on a coastal strategy 
were also driven by a desire to change the government’s reactive mindset, 
as it was accustomed to “dealing with issues along [the] coast in a very 
sector-based or one-off approach.”41 He further stated, that “things like 
coastal water quality, [Environment] would look at it from one angle, 
                                            
 36.  Memorandum of Understanding Between Canada and Nova Scotia Respecting 
Coastal and Oceans Management in Nova Scotia, March 23, 2011, clause G.  
 37.  Id. at clause 2.2(b). 
 38.  Id. at clause 2.3.    
 39.  Irish, supra note 32.  
 40.  Nova Scotia, Legislative Assembly Committee on Resources, Hansard, (23 
February 2012), at 4 (Greg Roach). 
 41.  Id. at 5 (Justin Huston). 
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[Fisheries] would look at it from a different angle” and therefore, no 
coordinated approach resulted from this practice.42 The continuing lack of 
a coastal strategy suggests that these issues have changed little.  
 During the same committee hearing, a member asked government 
representatives if the idea of a Coastal Act had been considered as a way 
of moving beyond policy documents.43 This proposition had previously 
been put forth by the Coastal Coalition of Nova Scotia and the Ecology 
Action Centre, who are both advocates for greater coastal management 
efforts. The coastal zone coordinator responded that, although the option 
was not totally discarded, it appeared to him that moving forward with a 
Coastal Act would be “putting the cart before the horse.”44 In May 2017, 
five years after that initial proposition, talks on a provincial Ocean Act 
resurfaced after renewed criticisms on the provincial government’s lax 
approach to coastal management.45  
 Seeing as the federal-provincial Memorandum of Understanding on 
coastal management stayed clear of its original objective to define 
government roles, and seeing as no coastal strategy was successfully 
adopted at a provincial level, a safe assumption is that the Coastal 
Management Framework’s goal to define clear federal and provincial 
responsibilities (and therefore address the issue of jurisdiction) was never 
accomplished. Instead, federal-provincial relations stayed at the level of 
broad statements of cooperation. Fournier described cooperation between 
both levels of government as “a reasonable approximation of the status 
quo.”46 Federal and provincial jurisdiction remained the elephant in the 
room. 
 Despite the lack of a provincial coastal strategy embracing marine 
spatial planning, Nova Scotia did adopt a strategy specific to marine 
renewable energy.47 Similarly, the federal government, through the 
Department of Fisheries and Oceans, also created a Regional Oceans Plan 
for the Scotian Shelf, the Atlantic Coast, and the Bay of Fundy.48 
However, the contribution of these two strategies in light of integrated 
                                            
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. at 7 (Mat Whynott). 
 44.  Id. at 8 (Justin Huston). 
 45.  Michael Tutton, N.S. Liberals Promise Coastal Law, Face Criticism for Lax 
Approach to Polluters CTV News (8 May 2017), https://atlantic.ctvnews.ca/n-s-liberals-
promise-coastal-law-face-criticism-for-lax-approach-to-polluters-1.3403477 
[https://perma.cc/JF4V-VSJ6]. 
 46.  Fournier, supra note 6, at 52.   
 47.  Nova Scotia Dept. of Energy, Marine Renewable Energy Strategy (May 2012).  
 48.  Regional Oceans Plan, supra note 4.  
10 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 24:1 
 
ocean management and marine spatial planning principles which the 
Fournier report aggressively put forward remains rather limited.  
 The Marine Renewable Energy Strategy, although apparently “built 
off the recommendations made by Dr. Fournier,”49 contains only a single 
mention of marine spatial planning in a footnote to the regulatory plan 
headline.50 The footnote simply reiterates Fournier’s recommendation to 
advance the concept and practice of marine spatial planning with no 
further context. The Strategy’s regulatory plan does not push for marine 
spatial planning as a regulatory priority and this is reflected in the outcome 
legislation examined in the following section. The Marine Renewable 
Energy Strategy acknowledges that ocean turbines “may affect tourism, 
landscapes, seascapes, habitats, and ecosystems,” and recognizes that 
ocean energy projects require “an integrated management approach.”51 
However, the strategy’s way of embracing integrated ocean management 
is by turning to the Provincial Oceans Network and aligning marine energy 
activities with the provincial Coastal Strategy.52 As discussed earlier in 
this section, the provincial Coastal Strategy was abandoned in 2013, 
leaving integrated ocean management plans for the marine renewable 
sector severely amputated.  
 The Marine Renewable Energy Strategy further notes that the tidal 
energy sector has been managed by an informal One Window Standing 
Committee with members of federal and provincial governments 
“interested in, or with authority for, marine projects.”53 The phrasing is 
significant as it once more evidences extreme caution and a persisting 
collaborative status quo in the face of jurisdictional ambiguity. The 
Strategy notes that the One Window Standing Committee delivered good 
results in the context of a demonstration project but that “a more 
customized and improved integrated regulatory system” could be 
necessary with the expansion of the marine renewable sector.54 In his 
report, Fournier similarly expressed a desire to move towards a more 
regulated framework.55 
 At the federal level, the Regional Oceans Plan for the Bay of Fundy 
simply “supports a spatial approach to oceans and coastal planning and 
                                            
 49.  Nova Scotia Dept. of Energy, Marine Renewable Energy Legislation,       
(December 15, 2017), https://energy.novascotia.ca/renewables/marine-renewable-energy
/marine-renewable-energy-legislation [https://perma.cc/QW2L-UA4V]. 
 50.  Marine Renewable Energy Strategy, supra note 47, at 27.  
 51.  Id. at 33.  
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. at 28.  
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id.; Fournier, supra note 6, at 49.  
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management” and recognizes that “the principles of marine and coastal 
spatial planning can provide . . . solutions for oceans and coastal 
management problems.”56 Although the Plan explicitly links marine 
spatial planning with the marine renewable energy sector, it is silent on 
any course of action. In fact, the Plan addresses the issue in a rather 
peculiar way by including an illustration of marine spatial conflicts in 
relation to tidal energy without elaborating further.57 This self-contained 
figure, however, offers one of the most comprehensive explanations of 
why marine spatial planning matters in the Bay of Fundy. It contains four 
consecutive maps, each showing specific interests in the bay, and 
highlights their overlapping and conflicting nature. The figure’s 
explanatory text deserves to be quoted in full, for it captures the essence 
of activity conflict in the Bay of Fundy and the benefits of marine spatial 
planning: 
[The figure] illustrates some of the overlapping ocean uses and 
conservation priorities in the context of 16 potential tidal energy 
sites identified in the Bay of Fundy. Marine spatial planning can 
help resolve tidal energy development options through 
identification, awareness raising and potential avoidance of spatial 
and temporal ocean use conflicts throughout the Bay. Map 
overlays include several marine protection priorities such as North 
Atlantic right whale critical habitat, the Musquash Estuary Marine 
Protected Area, and several well-known Ecologically and 
Biologically Significant Areas. Coastal aquaculture sites occur on 
both sides of the bay, supporting an active local marine economy 
in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. The bay is a very productive 
area for multiple fisheries that would blanket the map if all fishing 
activities were displayed … Commercial shipping routes into 
Saint John Harbour are illustrated by two dominate vessel traffic 
patterns at the entrance to the bay. In terms of seabed 
infrastructure, an active submarine telecommunications cable 
crosses the area at mid-bay.58  
 As it will be explained in the section below, Marine Renewable 
Electricity Areas (MREAs) established under the provincial Marine 
Renewable-Electricity Act, have been defined without resorting to marine 
spatial planning. Concretely, this means that some MREAs extend to some 
                                            
 56.  Regional Oceans Plan, supra note 4, at 7. 
 57.  Id. at 24. 
 58.  Id.  
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critical mammal habitats and areas associated with traditional practices 
such as fishing.  
 This section attempts to provide an overview of the limited 
contribution of policy work towards integrated ocean management and 
marine spatial planning with a focus on marine renewable energy in the 
Bay of Fundy. A careful assessment of the policy outcomes examined 
above reveals that, at the heart of the current framework (or lack thereof), 
lies a buried debate on jurisdiction. At times, explicitly and  at other times 
implicitly, federal-provincial tensions over jurisdiction have been a 
shaping factor in the decision-making process. Recognizing the need for 
coordinated coastal management in political discourse has not been greatly 
problematic. Developing and operationalizing such management, 
however, has. As noted during a meeting of the Nova Scotia Standing 
Committee on Resources, the idea behind a provincial coastal strategy was 
to take concrete action “instead of just saying at a high level that we love 
the coast, we want good, sustainable jobs and a clean environment.”59 
However, the strategy fell into oblivion and concrete action along with it.   
 It is perhaps useful to recall that both the provincial Coastal Strategy 
and the federal-provincial Memorandum of Understanding were intended 
to achieve greater clarity on federal and provincial roles under the Coastal 
Management Framework. None of these so-called “strategic activities” 
fulfilled their desired effect. The Memorandum explicitly placed the issue 
of roles and jurisdiction off-limits, recognizing the sensitive nature of the 
question and foreseeing a certain polarity in the arguments of federal and 
provincial governments. Additionally, the Marine Renewable Energy 
Strategy relied on a non-existent provincial Coastal Strategy to articulate 
integrated ocean management. The federal Coastal Plan for the Bay of 
Fundy, although remarkably explicit on the concrete benefits of marine 
spatial planning, provided no indication as to how (and under what 
regulatory authority) such planning could be achieved. 
 In light of the above, and considering Fournier’s assertion that federal 
and provincial jurisdictional issues concerning marine renewable energy 
“are complex and unlikely to be resolved in the near future,” namely 
because the domestic jurisdiction over the of Bay of Fundy is unsettled,60 
the correlation between undefined federal-provincial boundaries and 
failure to implement integrated ocean management becomes obvious. 
Before discussing boundaries in the Bay of Fundy, the following section 
                                            
 59.  Nova Scotia, Legislative Assembly Committee on Resources, Hansard, (23 
February 2012) (Justin Huston) [hereinafter Legislative Assembly Committee on 
Resources (23 February 2012)]. 
 60.  Fournier, supra note 6, at 17-18; Doelle supra note 10, at 8-9.   
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provides a brief overview of how the legal framework, just as the policy 
framework, fell short of pushing for a holistic, pre-emptive and spatially 
aware structure for marine renewable energy regulation.  
C. The Marine Renewable Energy Act 
In 2015, the Nova Scotia legislative assembly adopted the Marine 
Renewable-energy Act. In 2017, prior to its entry into force, the Act was 
amended to better suit the needs of an evolving industry.61 During the 
second reading of the amending act, the Minister of Energy stressed 
multiple times that these amendments were addressing and responding to 
the needs of developers.62 He insisted, “[w]e’re giving industry the tools 
they need to prove their innovations work. We’re being responsive to the 
needs of the private sector.”63 His comments, which clearly put the 
industry as the driving force of the legislative process, set the stage for a 
proposal to include demonstration permits within the act and alter the 
boundaries of a previously established MREA. The motivations behind the 
amendment reflected a reactive and sector-based approach, an approach 
which the failed Coastal Strategy, a few years back, had tried to suppress.64 
The near-sightedness of this industry-tailored Act was made apparent 
by recurrent references to the needs of a single company, Big Moon 
Power, during parliamentary debates. A member of the Nova Scotia 
legislative assembly went as far as saying that, according to her, the Act 
appeared to be custom-made for a specific player of the tidal energy 
industry. Mrs. Lisa Roberts recognized that Big Moon Power had captured 
the interest of decisionmakers and warned against the perils of enacting 
legislation with narrow goals and visible favoritism:  
People are excited about Big Moon Power, and I certainly think 
we need Nova Scotia to create the space where someone with a 
great idea that appears to work in prototypes can fully deploy it 
and see how it works. That is what I understand the point of this 
bill to be. A question that I hope might get explored a little bit in 
Law Amendments Committee is why, to my reading, this bill 
seems to only allow capacity for one company. Because of the 
limits in terms of megawatts on this bill, it seems to me like it's 
                                            
 61.  An Act to Amend Chapter 32 of the Acts of 2015, the Marine Renewable-energy 
Act, S.N.S. 2017, c 12 (Can.). 
 62.  Nova Scotia, Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 63rd Assembly, 1st Sess (12 October 
2017), at 1153 (Hon Geoff MacLellan).  
 63.  Id. at 1155.  
 64.  Legislative Assembly Committee on Resource (23 February 2012) supra, note 59.  
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very specifically designed for one idea, and I always think that's a 
little bit dangerous in terms of legislation.65 
Despite Mrs. Lisa Robert’s wish to see a revised bill after thorough 
examination by the Law Amendments Committee, the amending act was 
passed without any modifications.66  
Mr. Alan MacMaster of the legislative assembly also took the time to 
voice his concerns on the development of marine renewable energy law 
during the second reading of the amending act. His intervention concerned 
the Petit Passage, an area which the Act designates as a MREA, and 
therefore allows energy development within its confines.67 MacMaster, 
while believing in the economic benefits of the tidal industry, held that 
fishermen were worried about the Petit Passage being cut in half with the 
arrival of tidal turbines.68 To this, MacMaster added that the Petit Passage 
is “one of the most prime areas in the province to see a whale” and “if 
technology is being introduced into an area that’s sensitive like that, we 
can see why people are concerned.”69 
 It’s worth noting that the Petit Passage is labelled as ecologically and 
biologically significant under the federal Coastal Plan for the Bay of 
Fundy.70 The federal Coastal Plan had therefore already pointed to the 
overlap between tidal energy sites and priority conservation areas such as 
the Petit Passage, roughly coinciding with Mr. MacMaster’s remark on the 
area’s significance for marine mammals. These corroborating statements 
are alarming when assessed from the angle of marine spatial planning, or 
rather a certain disregard for its underlying principles. Some authors, in 
fact, highlight that MREAs did not “undergo a formally structured 
planning framework” and this explains their inconvenient location in 
terms of environmental protection.71 Sangiuliano and Mastrantonis 
suggest that a formal marine spatial plan would have had the effect of 
                                            
 65.  Nova Scotia, Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 63rd Assembly, 1st Sess (12 October 
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2017), at 1488. 
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 71.  Stephen Sangiuliano & Stanley Mastrantonis, From Scotland to New Scotland: 
Constructing a Sectoral Marine Plan for Tidal Energy for Nova Scotia, 84 MARINE POLICY 
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spatially defining MREAs differently than was done in the Act’s 
schedules.72  
 This last point merits further explanation. Sangiuliano and 
Mastrantonis carried out a theoretical construction of a marine spatial plan 
for Nova Scotia based on the criteria utilized in the Scottish model. The 
authors concluded that the Petit Passage MREA, as described in the Act, 
should have been smaller in size due to constraints “associated with 
shipping, commercial fishing, tourism and recreational use, and 
indigenous cultural use.”73 Fishermen’s concerns regarding shrinkage of 
the passage with the arrival of tidal turbines paired with Sangiuliano and 
Mastrantonis’ proposition to reduce the size of the Petit Passage MREA 
because of commercial fishing are strikingly reconciling positions rooted 
in marine spatial planning. What’s more, these two authors also noted that 
the Digby Gut MREA, not far from the Petit Passage, should have never 
been statutorily established by the Marine Renewable-energy Act due to a 
“heavy constraint emanating from marine mammal habitat, commercial 
shipping, and indigenous cultural use.”74 This is also not without recalling 
Mr. MacMaster’s observations on the region’s appeal for whale sightings. 
 Sangiuliano and Mastrantonis’ theoretical construction of a marine 
spatial plan for the Bay of Fundy is an eye-opening exercise that illustrates 
the real dangers associated with an industry-driven approach, which is at 
odds with the basic foundations of integrated ocean management. 
Furthermore, the corroborating information conveyed by Mr. MacMaster 
during parliamentary debate, the federal Coastal Plan, and Sangiuliano and 
Mastrantonis article is strong evidence that MREAs, as currently 
established, did not frame the marine renewable energy sector to stay clear 
of imminent environmental, social and commercial conflicts.   
Thus, despite some form of spatial awareness in the Marine 
Renewable-energy Act, namely through the establishment of confined 
Marine Renewable Electricity Areas, the above illustrates how a lack of 
intersectoral, pre-emptive and integrated planning undermines the 
effectiveness of MREAs, while posing significant problems to 
environmental interests and traditional coastal activities. Moreover, the 
Act has made apparent the existing uncertainty regarding jurisdictional 
control over parts of the Bay of Fundy. Beyond foreseeable consultation 
provisions which open the door to a federal role in ocean energy 
management,75 the Act also excludes “any and all privately owned land 
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 75.  See, e.g., Marine Renewable-energy Act, S.N.S. 2015, c 32, § 51 (Can.).   
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and land under the administration of Canada” from MREAs.76 Whether or 
not “land” includes submerged areas is a question that has been previously 
raised in  constitutional interpretation.77 Only future interpretations of the 
Act will reveal what exactly is meant by this exclusion with regard to 
MREAs.78   
The previous section relating to the marine renewable energy policy 
framework attempted to set out the relationship between jurisdictional 
ambiguity and the lack of cohesive ocean management. This section has 
drawn attention to the Act’s sector-based approach, an unsurprising 
outcome considering the examined background policy, and concretely 
illustrated the multidimensional implications of a legal framework that 
sets aside the principles of marine spatial planning. From a geopolitical 
standpoint, spatial planning is simply not possible when federal and 
provincial governments are unsure of where one’s jurisdiction ends and 
where the other’s jurisdiction begins. This political obstacle to integrated 
and planned coastal management, as posited earlier, can be traced back to 
federal-provincial feuds on domestic boundaries in the Bay of Fundy. Part 
III of this paper tells the tale of shifting maritime borders in the area and 
discusses how unsettled claims of jurisdiction have shaped the current law 
and policy.   
III. AN INCONSISTENT HISTORY OF BOUNDARIES IN THE BAY OF 
FUNDY 
A. The Colonial Boundaries of the Bay 
From the beginning, Great Britain took the position, both in its 
international and municipal dealings, that the bays in the Atlantic region 
were integral parts of the territory of the colonies.79  
 
 In 1621, the grant of Nova Scotia to Sir William Alexander described 
the western boundary of the province as a “straight line crossing the 
entrance or mouth of that great ship road” from Saint Mary’s Bay to the 
                                            
 76.  See, e.g., Id. at Schedules D-F.  
 77.  Nichols & Monahan, supra note 7 at 4. 
 78.  See, e.g., Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, S.C. 1999, c 33 (Can.) 
and Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, S.C. 2012 c 19, § 52 (Can.) for 
statutes including submerged areas under the definition of “federal land.” 
 79.  Gérard V. La Forest, Canadian Inland Waters of the Atlantic Provinces and the 
Bay of Fundy Incident, 1 THE CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 149-171, 150 
(1963) [hereinafter La Forest, Canadian Inland Waters]. 
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River Ste-Croix.80 The “great ship road,” as it was later explained, in fact 
referred to the Bay of Fundy.81 The grant to Sir William Alexander had 
the effect of enclosing the Bay of Fundy within the province of Nova 
Scotia, at the time including modern-day New Brunswick.82 Although 
some doubt existed as to whether “the limits mentioned in the Alexander 
grant were the true limits of the province,”83 the bay’s inclusion within the 
confines of Nova Scotia was confirmed in the commission to Montague 
Wilmot in 1763 and in the commission to Lord William Campbell in 
1765.84 Both these commissions described Nova Scotia’s western 
boundary as a line drawn “across the entrance of the Bay of Fundy” from 
Cape Sable to the River St. Croix.85 
Shortly after the Thirteen Colonies gained their independence from 
Great Britain and formed the United States in 1776, groups faithful to the 
British Crown began making their way into Nova Scotia.86 These settlers 
gathered in large numbers along the mouth of the Saint John river, not far 
from its point of discharge into the Bay of Fundy, in what is nowadays part 
of New Brunswick. The banks of the Saint John river became populated 
with Loyalists coming from the newly formed United States. Great Britain 
therefore sought to create a new province, one with a closer administrative 
pole than Halifax.87 Under this context, the king set a Royal Commission 
establishing the province of New Brunswick in 1784. The letters patent 
issued by the British crown, the ones which established the province of 
New Brunswick, described colonel Thomas Carleton’s appointment as 
governor of the province and established the southern boundary of New 
Brunswick in the terms expressed below: 
Wee reposing especial Trust and Confidence in the prudence, 
Courage and Loyalty of you the said Thomas Carleton, of our 
especial Grace certain Knowledge and mere Motion, have thought 
fit to constitute and appoint you the said Thomas Carleton to be 
                                            
 80.  John B. Moore, History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to Which the 
United States Has Been a Party 1, 51 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1898). 
 81.   Id. at 50. 
 82.  Gérard V. La Forest, Natural Resources and Public Property under the Canadian 
Constitution 86 (University of Toronto Press, 1969) [hereinafter La Forest, Natural 
Resources and Public Property].   
 83.  Moore, supra, note 80 at 51. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  W. M. Jarvis, “Royal Commission and Instructions to Governor Thomas Carleton, 
August, 1784” in Collections of the New Brunswick Historical Society 6, 391 (Saint John, 
NB: The Sun Printing Company Limited, 1905).  
 87.  Id. at 392.  
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our Captain General and Governor in Chief of our province of 
New Brunswick bounded . . . to the South by a Line in the Center 
of the Bay of Fundy from the River Saint Croix aforesaid to the 
Mouth of the Musquat River by the said River to its source.88 
Similarly, the Royal Commission to Lord Elgin, in 1846, described the 
western boundary of the province of Nova Scotia as being “a line drawn 
from Cape Sable across the entrance to the centre of the Bay of Fundy” 
and the northern boundary being “a line drawn along the centre of the said 
bay to the mouth of the Musquat river.”89 As a result of these two Royal 
Commissions, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia were clearly divided by a 
middle line in the Bay of Fundy.  
In the years preceding the Canadian confederation, several indicators 
showed that Great Britain considered the Bay of Fundy to be an integral 
part of its provincial colonies. For example, An Act to Compel Vessels 
Navigating in the Bay of Fundy to Carry Lights,90 passed in 1858 by the 
provincial government of New Brunswick under authority of the Crown, 
required vessels navigating in the Bay of Fundy to carry “a good signal 
light,” failure to comply would result in a fine “of five pounds for each 
and every neglect.”91 Although the act referred to the Bay of Fundy as a 
whole and did not make a distinction between parts under Nova Scotian 
jurisdiction and those under New Brunswick jurisdiction, it is clear that 
the provincial parliament considered the bay to be fully within the British 
colony. However short, the act-imposed requirements on vessels 
navigating in those waters and implicitly recognized power of the coastal 
authority to collect penalties associated with breach of the act. The content 
of this act confirms Ballem’s assertion that maritime provinces can 
provide statutory evidence of their exercise of jurisdiction in the Bay of 
Fundy prior to Confederation.92 
The boundaries of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia were, as 
discussed above, originally established by executive acts of the British 
Crown. The Royal Commissions setting the limits of both provinces came 
from the English monarch and enjoyed highest authority at a time when 
                                            
 88.  Id. at 394 (emphasis added). 
 89.  La Forest, National Resources and the Public Property, supra, note 82 at 86 n.7 
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the sovereign’s powers enabled him to demarcate the territory of his 
colonies.93 To this day, these commissions continue to be the main 
grounds for colonial territorial claims based on historic titles.94 The line at 
the centre of the Bay of Fundy, insofar as it represents the colonial 
boundary brought into Confederation by New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, 
has significant jurisdictional implications.95 
Referring to the letters patent (or commissions) establishing provincial 
boundaries, Gérard La Forest stated that “these prerogative instruments 
had virtually statutory force.”96 Similarly, W. M. Jarvis wrote in 1905 that 
“[n]o question . . . can now arise as to the authority of Governor Carleton's 
Commission and Instructions or the later Commissions issued to other 
Governors in similar terms.”97 Both La Forest and Jarvis have pointed to 
the widespread recognition of boundaries established by Royal 
Commission, namely in subsequent acts adopted by British and Canadian 
parliaments.98 These Royal Commissions form the point of departure to 
study the Bay of Fundy’s modern geopolitical construction.99  
 In 1867, the Constitution Act declared that “the Provinces of Nova 
Scotia and New Brunswick shall have the same limits as at the passing of 
this Act.”100 These limits would have apparently been those established by 
the Royal Commissions referred to in the paragraphs above. For some, the 
inclusion of such boundaries within the Constitution Act of 1867 gave the 
Royal Commissions “whatever of validity may have at first been 
wanting.”101 However, others theorize that if a Canadian court were to find 
the offshore grants made in the Royal Commissions invalid under 
international law, Nova Scotia’s claim to the Bay of Fundy on grounds of 
these commissions would fail.102 
 The North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration was the first post-
Confederation instance in which conflicting claims in the Bay of Fundy 
implicitly questioned the scope of the Royal Commissions. In 1910, Great-
                                            
 93.  La Forest, Canadian Inland Waters, supra note 79, at 156. 
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Britain (still negotiating on behalf of Canada on international matters) and 
the United States submitted a dispute to the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration.103 Their dispute concerned the United States’ rights of fishing 
in Canadian and British Atlantic waters. Specifically, the matter related to 
the interpretation of a treaty concluded between the United States and 
Great Britain in 1818, under which the United States namely renounced a 
right to fish within three marine miles of bays “of His Britannic Majesty’s 
Dominions in America.”104  
 In interpreting the relevant treaty provision, the Court concluded that 
the three miles were to be measured “from a straight line drawn across the 
body of water at the place where it ceases to have the configuration and 
characteristics of a bay.”105 However, this rule might not have enclosed 
the Bay of Fundy in the same way that the grant to Sir William Alexander 
did. This is because the Court suggested the application of such rule to 
bays, not exceeding ten miles in width, excepting those bays recognized 
as territorial.106 If the bay did not fit one of these two categories, “the three 
marine miles [were] to be measured following the sinuosities of the 
coast.”107 It is perhaps this very debate on the nature of the Bay of Fundy 
which caused British and American representatives to exclude it from the 
arbitration. Through an exchange of letters, British and American 
ambassadors agreed that “no question as to the Bay of Fundy, considered 
as a whole” was to be included in the arbitration “it being the intention of 
the parties that their respective views or contentions” should not be 
affected by the Court’s findings.108  
The exclusion of the Bay of Fundy from the arbitration was significant 
in that it revealed Great Britain’s strong territorial attachment and 
historical claims to the bay as well as American protests of such claims. 
Excluding the Bay of Fundy from the arbitration was however a double-
edged sword. While it did not subject the Bay of Fundy to a three-mile 
limit “following the sinuosities of the coast” (and thus opening the central 
portion of the bay to foreign fishing), it also had the effect of leaving 
unconfirmed the status of those waters. Great-Britain’s exercise of 
jurisdiction within the bay might have been enough for the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration to conclude that the Bay of Fundy was territorial and 
close it off to American fishers.109 This could have prevented subsequent 
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confusion explored in the following section. In fact, La Forest argued that 
Great Britain’s exercise of jurisdiction in the Bay of Fundy was apparent 
since “a substantial number of the seizures of American ships for violating 
the 1818 convention” happened within its waters.110  
La Forest admitted, that “as a matter of courtesy, Great Britain allowed 
American fishermen to fish within the Bay of Fundy, but recalled that 
“relaxations of a claim [of territoriality] should not be construed as 
renunciations of it” because “[s]uch a construction . . . would not only be 
intrinsically inequitable, but internationally injurious, in that it would 
discourage conciliatory diplomatic transactions and encourage the 
assertion of extreme claims in their fullest extent.”111  
B. The Russian Fleet Incident: A Contradictory Discourse 
 In 1936, the parliament of Canada adopted An Act to Amend the 
Customs Act.112 The Act described “Canadian waters” as “all territorial 
waters of Canada and all waters forming part of the territory of Canada,” 
which the Minister of National Revenue also described as “roughly 
speaking . . . all the marine league, that is the waters included within the 
three mile limit” from the shore.113 He also specified, that “the powers to 
be exercised outside the marine league, outside of Canadian waters, so-
called, are very limited” and that these were, in essence, police powers.114 
According to the maps released by the Canadian Department of National 
Revenue by virtue of certain provisions of the Act, the central part of the 
Bay of Fundy, that is, the portion beyond the three mile limit calculated 
from the coast, was excluded from the national territory. This was a rather 
peculiar delimitation since it appeared to contradict Sir William 
Alexander’s grant. This grant, as it should be recalled, had included the 
bay within Nova Scotia and, a fortiori, within Canada following section 7 
of the Constitution Act, 1867.  
 The Customs Act’s delimitation of Canadian waters in the Bay of 
Fundy therefore operated as a drastic rupture from the previously strong 
colonial position that the bay in its entirety fell under Canadian 
jurisdiction. Oddly, the three-mile limit adhered to by the Department of 
National Revenue strongly resembled what would have been the three-
                                            
 110.  La Forest, Canadian Inland Waters, supra, note 79 at 161.  
 111.  Id.; The North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case, supra, note 103 at 199. 
 112.  An Act to Amend the Customs Act, S.C. 1936, c 30 (Can).  
 113.  House of Commons Debates, 18th Parl, 1st Sess, No 4 (29 May 1936), at 3221 
(Hon James Lorimer Ilsley). 
 114.  Id. 
22 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 24:1 
 
mile limit “following the sinuosities of the coast” developed in the North 
Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration. This is precisely the kind of 
delimitation that Great Britain tried to avoid by excluding the Bay of 
Fundy from the arbitration. While the Canadian parliament’s endorsement 
of the three-mile limit perhaps rested on existing customary practice in 
international maritime boundary delimitation, this resonated with 
Harrison’s assertion that Canada confused, from this point onwards, its 
claims under international law and those strictly concerned with domestic 
matters on federal-provincial coastal jurisdiction.115  
 The federal government’s unilateral definition of Canadian waters in 
the Customs Act marked the beginning of federal-provincial tensions 
regarding the status of the Bay of Fundy. It appears from chapter twenty-
eight, section three of the Constitution Act, 1871116 that the Canadian 
parliament could only alter the boundaries of provinces with the consent 
of concerned provincial legislatures.117 A unilateral act from the Canadian 
parliament could not bypass Nova Scotia and New Brunswicks’ claims to 
the bay and alter their British-drawn limits.118 While some were of the 
view that the boundaries reflected in those maps were for the sole purpose 
of regulating customs and were without prejudice to Canadian territorial 
claims,119 this view is challenged by the language employed in the Act, the 
comments made by the Minister of National Revenue, and subsequent 
federal government behavior.  
 In the early sixties, an incident involving the presence of a Russian 
fleet in the Bay of Fundy forced the federal government to take a position 
with respect to those waters. Unfortunately, federal officials did not speak 
with one voice and addressed the issue in a rather clumsy manner. On 
November 14, 1962, the New Brunswick Telegraph-Journal published an 
article quoting a federal government official saying that “as long as [the 
Russians] stayed outside the three-mile limit, they would be subject to no 
restrictions from Canada.”120 Although the Canadian government’s 
inaction might have shocked more than a few at the peak of the Cold War, 
this position seemed consistent with the earlier views expressed by the 
Minister of National Revenue concerning the country’s boundaries and the 
statutory definition of Canadian waters expressed in the Customs Act.  
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 The Telegraph-Journal reporter also noted that the Russian fleet, 
although alarmingly close to Canadian coasts, had stayed clear of the 
three-mile limit and anchored ten miles from the New Brunswick port of 
Saint John.121 This was possibly due to a recognition, on both the Canadian 
and Russian sides, that Canada’s jurisdiction did not extend beyond three 
miles from the shore, a position clearly at odds with the provincial 
delineations of the Royal Commissions. 
 On the same day of the Telegraph-Journal’s first report of the Russian 
fleet incident in the Maritimes, Premier Robichaud of New Brunswick sent 
a telegram to federal Prime Minister Diefenbaker, with a copy to Nova 
Scotian Prime Minister Robert L. Stanfield.122 In the telegram, Premier 
Robichaud stated: 
I am very much disturbed at the newspaper report regarding the 
presence of a Russian fishing fleet in the Bay of Fundy. . . . This 
report in part states “No particular interest is being shown the fleet 
by the Canadian departments of fisheries and transport.” . . . The 
Bay of Fundy is an integral part of the Provinces of New 
Brunswick and Nova Scotia. It is so described in the commission 
establishing Nova Scotia, then including New Brunswick, in 
1621. . . . The commission of Sir Thomas Carleton gave the 
boundaries of New Brunswick as including the northern half of 
Bay of Fundy. . . . These boundaries were preserved by section 7 
of the BNA Act . . . . Request Canada protest to Russia in violation 
of Canadian territory.123 
Prime Minister Diefenbaker, after receiving the telegram, addressed the 
issue in the House of Commons.124 He asserted having examined previous 
debates pertaining to Canadian jurisdiction in coastal waters, and 
specifically, “whether or not the three mile limit applie[d] in certain areas 
such as in the Bay of Fundy.”125 He noted that a decision on the appropriate 
course of action was still pending.126 When Mr. Pearson,  then leader of 
the opposition, asked the Prime Minister to explain why this situation was 
                                            
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Dief Wants Russians out of the Bay of Fundy, The Telegraph-Journal (Nov. 16, 
1962) at 1. 
 123.  Id. at 3 (quoting Dave Butler, The Russians in the Bay of Fundy, The Telegraph-
Journal (Nov. 14, 1962)(first citing Moores Arbitrations, Vol. 1, at 33,50; and then citing 
Canadian Sessional Papers of 1881, No. 70 at 47). 
 124.  House of Commons Debates, 25th Parl, 1st Sess, No 2 (14 November 1962), at 
1617 (Right Hon JG Diefenbaker). 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. 
24 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 24:1 
 
different from previous cases in which Canada had protested against the 
presence of American fishing vessels in the Bay of Fundy, Prime Minister 
Diefenbaker stated that this was “the type of question which require[d] 
notice in order that the situation may be looked into.”127 The issue of the 
Russian fishing fleet was again raised in the House of Commons the 
following day. Prime Minister Diefenbaker, responding to a question from 
the opposition as to whether the Canadian government would take any 
action, stated that: 
[t]he Bay of Fundy has always been considered, since the earliest 
days, first by Great Britain and thereafter by successive Canadian 
Governments, as Canadian territorial waters. As far back as 1763 
it was described in official documents as being comprised within 
the boundaries of what is now Canada. There are strong 
geographic and economic considerations for this. Having regard 
to the fact that there have been two Soviet vessels in this area, 
instructions have been given that if these vessels, whose presence 
was reported yesterday, have not left already, they will be made 
aware of the position Canada takes and requested to leave.128 
 The federal government oscillated between a position reflective of its 
then recent maps and statutes, ones which placed the national boundary at 
three miles from the shore, and a position which reflected the historical 
character of the Bay with an emphasis on the boundaries that Nova Scotia 
and New Brunswick brought into Confederation. Prime Minister 
Diefenbaker’s implicit message was that, after due consideration, the 
three-mile limit did not apply to the Bay of Fundy. He therefore ordered 
that action be taken against the presence of the Russian vessels. This 
seemed, at first glance, a victory for Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. 
However, the assertions of Premier Robichaud and those of Premier 
Diefenbaker require further semantical attention.  
 In his telegram, Premier Robichaud insisted that “[t]he Bay of Fundy 
[was] an integral part of the Provinces of New Brunswick and Nova 
Scotia.”129  Although Premier Diefenbaker’s later discourse seemed to 
echo Robichaud’s position, it in fact asserted something meaningfully 
different; “the Bay of Fundy has always been considered . . . as Canadian 
territorial waters. . . . [I]t was described in official documents as being 
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comprised within the boundaries of what is now Canada.”130 The latter 
statement is not technically incompatible with the first, but it clearly 
conveyed that the federal government was not ready to recognize New 
Brunswick and Nova Scotia’s claims of ownership over the Bay of Fundy. 
 The Canadian Parliament might have also had motives other than 
those resting on historical titles for showing some teeth in the later stages 
of the Russian fleet incident. In the past, the government had struggled to 
justify the narrow definition of Canadian waters within the Customs Act, 
seeing as it “had defined [these] waters . . . more narrowly than was 
necessary.”131 Indeed, the government was asked on multiple occasions 
why it had chosen a three-mile instead of a twelve-mile limit to its coastal 
jurisdiction.132 Perhaps the federal government’s volte-face after an initial 
tolerance of the Russian fleet in the Bay of Fundy was triggered by a 
certain awareness of this fact. Public opinion also probably played a part 
in revisiting the government’s first position regarding the Soviet boats 
surveying the Canadian coast.  
C. Seabed Resources and the Surge of Administrative Resource 
Lines 
 Only a few years after the Russian fleet incident, a different debate 
developed out of the growing interest in minerals and oil found in the 
seabed. In 1967, the Canadian government requested an opinion from the 
Supreme Court of Canada regarding jurisdiction over offshore resources 
in light of its existing feud with the government of British Columbia.133 
Both levels of government argued that exploitation and administration of 
submerged resources fell under their sphere of competence.134 To all the 
questions submitted, which concerned proprietary rights and jurisdiction, 
the Court concluded in favor of Canada.135 The Court greatly relied on an 
English case, R. v. Keyn,136 to conclude that a province’s jurisdiction ended 
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at a point commonly referred to as the “ordinary low-water mark” unless 
historical titles and positive exercise of jurisdiction by the province (prior 
to Confederation) could be demonstrated.137 
 Some put forth that the Court’s conclusions were without prejudice 
to the claims of other provinces since the opinion was specific to the case 
of British Columbia.138 Moreover, as made apparent through the second 
part of the paper, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick have seemingly strong 
evidence to support a historical claim in the Bay of Fundy, which could 
grant them jurisdiction over the waters and the seabed.139 Harrison and 
Doelle are of the view that the Supreme Court of Canada, in Reference Re: 
Offshore mineral rights, implicitly recognized the historical title of these 
two maritime provinces over the Bay of Fundy, while nevertheless 
pointing to the non-binding character of the Court’s opinion.140 In the 
Reference, the Court alluded to a New Brunswick case in which the 
provincial court found that a ship seizure in the Bay of Fundy occurred 
within the territory of the province.141 The Supreme Court of Canada, 
taking into account the Royal Commission to Thomas Carleton and the 
boundary drawn at the centre of the Bay of Fundy, confirmed that this 
seizure happened “within the Province of New Brunswick.”142 However, 
this distinguishing by the Court was soon after tempered by high-level 
political statements.  
 Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, in the aftermath of the 
Supreme Court’s opinion, addressed the House of Commons and stated: 
The reference to the Supreme Court was designed to determine in 
the most authoritative way where the jurisdiction rests. . . . In light 
of the Supreme Court’s unanimous finding in favor of the crown 
in right of Canada, on the basis of principles that would appear 
to be substantially applicable to the east coast as well as to the 
west coast, the main problem becomes one of delineating the areas 
concerned to meet the practical requirements of mineral resource 
administration. . . . [W]e have drawn so-called mineral resource 
administration lines, always well within the area of federal 
jurisdiction on the basis of the principles laid down in the Supreme 
Court opinion, with the intention that the federal government will 
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administer all offshore mineral rights seaward from these lines. . . 
. The proposed administrative lines enclose several offshore 
areas which are linked closely with adjacent provincial lands. . . 
. Off the east coast they include large areas of the sea bottom in 
the Bay of Fundy. . . . It is clearly in the interest of all levels of 
government that conditions are such as to facilitate the rapid 
development of Canada’s offshore minerals. For our part, we wish 
to do everything possible to avoid jurisdictional disputes that 
would hinder or delay the development of these natural 
resources. This is the spirit in which we are offering to work out 
these arrangements with the provinces.143 
 Trudeau’s statement set the framework of what I, in this paper, argue 
to be the modern-day approach to ocean governance in the face of 
jurisdictional ambiguity. Several of his remarks are worth commenting on. 
First, Trudeau raised considerable doubts regarding the scope of the 
Supreme Court reference by claiming a pan-Canadian application of the 
Court’s findings.144 Second, the Prime Minister developed a system that 
shut the door to further claims of jurisdiction, clearly expressing that the 
federal government had no desire to pursue domestic boundary debates.145 
This desire to avoid domestic jurisdictional discourse has been present 
ever since. Third, Trudeau institutionalized an issue-driven practice when 
developing administrative lines for the sole purpose of regulating offshore 
mineral resources. The relevance of those lines and those that followed 
(for example, those of the offshore oil industry) seems unclear with respect 
to other offshore activities such as marine renewable energy. Fourth, the 
Prime Minister’s initiative to develop administrative lines with no 
territorial (and jurisdictional) implications added confusion to an already 
complex governance structure under Canadian federalism.  
 Trudeau’s federal resource administration lines closed off the Bay of 
Fundy and recognized the right of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick to 
administer mineral resources in the bay. However, they did not contribute 
to greater territorial clarity given their confined purpose and their lack of 
jurisdictional significance. Furthermore, the resource administration lines 
proposed by the federal government were contested by the Atlantic 
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provinces and Québec in a 1972 communiqué.146 Instead, these provinces 
urged Ottawa to recognize the boundaries that were agreed upon among 
themselves at an earlier date, largely reflecting the limits defined in a 1964 
joint statement.147  
  In 1964, the four Atlantic provinces had indeed drawn their 
interprovincial boundaries without the federal government’s participation 
and included them in a joint statement.148 In this statement, Nova Scotia 
and New Brunswick relied on the line in middle of the Bay of Fundy to 
divide their provinces. However, the full extent of this delimitation was 
unclear. It was only in 2001, when a dispute arose between Newfoundland, 
Labrador and Nova Scotia regarding their interprovincial boundaries, that 
an arbitral tribunal clarified the scope of the document. While Nova Scotia 
aggressively argued that the document reflected an “agreement” binding 
between the parties,149 the tribunal came to the opposite conclusion. It 
noted that “[t]he tenor of the Joint Statement [was] inconsistent with any 
intent to enter into a final and binding agreement with immediate effect,” 
and that, “[t]he terms of the Joint Statement [were] more consistent with a 
political, provisional or tentative agreement, which may [have led] to a 
formal agreement but which [was] not in itself that agreement.”150  
 It’s important to add that in 1972, when the Atlantic provinces and 
Québec contested the federal resource administration lines and put forward 
their own boundary delimitation, Premier Regan of Nova Scotia ensured 
correspondence with Ottawa.151 Regan sent a telegraph to Prime Minister 
Trudeau with the claims of the 1972 communiqué and, in turn, received a 
letter from his federal counterpart stating Ottawa’s refusal to recognize the 
interprovincial boundaries agreed among the Atlantic provinces.152 
Trudeau’s letter indicated that “ownership and the extent of provincial 
territory, as well as the location of provincial boundaries are matters of 
law. The only way they can properly be settled, if the provinces definitely 
wish to contest them, is in the Supreme Court.”153 Trudeau added that he 
saw “no purpose to be served by discussion of these legal matters.”154 In 
1977, the federal government signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
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with Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island in which it 
recognized the 1964 lines for resource administration purposes, but not as 
provincial boundaries.155 
 The government of Canada therefore presented litigation as the only 
effective means of settling the federal-provincial boundary dispute. As a 
result, the jurisdictional debate in the political sphere has been completely 
cut off.  In the Atlantic region, only Newfoundland and Labrador turned 
to the courts to resolve its maritime claims.156 A clear prohibition of 
boundary-related discussions between federal and provincial governments 
combined with a political back and forth on the status of the Bay of Fundy 
and visible confusion regarding single-purpose delimitations has resulted 
in the current “tippy-toed” approach to ocean governance. This approach, 
described at length in the first part of this paper as regards marine 
renewable energy law and policy, is confirmed by practice in the offshore 
oil and gas sector. On this issue, Canadian and Nova Scotian governments 
have “agreed to disagree”157 and, in the process of doing so, adopted an 
overly cautious method of addressing offshore management.  
 While a thorough examination of the history and functioning of the 
Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board is beyond the scope of this 
paper, some elements supporting this paper’s claims are worth noting. In 
1986, the federal and provincial governments concluded the Canada-Nova 
Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord, which was later 
implemented through “mirror” legislation.158 This practice, which consists 
of enacting equivalent legislation at federal and provincial levels, has the 
effect of bypassing the issue of jurisdiction.159 Both the Canada-Nova 
Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act160 (at 
federal level) and the Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources 
Accord Implementation (Nova Scotia) Act161 (at provincial level) describe 
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the limits of the offshore areas under joint management.162 For the Bay of 
Fundy, the limit essentially reflects the 1964 and 1977 administration line, 
cutting the bay in half.  
 However, both governments have clearly forbidden territorial claims 
based on the provisions of those implementing acts. The federal statute 
reads, “[f]or greater certainty, the provisions of this Act shall not be 
interpreted as providing a basis for any claim by or on behalf of any 
province in respect of any interest in or legislative jurisdiction over any 
offshore area or any living or non-living resources of any offshore area.”163 
Similarly, Nova Scotia’s implementing act states that “[t]he provisions of 
this Act shall not be construed as providing a basis for any claim by or on 
behalf of the Government of Canada in respect of any entitlement to or 
legislative jurisdiction over the offshore area or any living or non-living 
resources in the offshore area.”164  
 When it comes to offshore governance, the government of Canada 
and the government of Nova Scotia both address the issue as though 
walking on eggshells. Regulation is replete with disclaimers, as each 
government avoids giving the other reason to believe that they have 
somehow ceded to their claims of jurisdiction. In the process of being 
excessively cautious, both governments have developed an approach to 
ocean governance that is issue-driven, narrowly defined and 
jurisdictionally ambiguous. This is the legacy of historically inconsistent 
discourse on domestic boundaries. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 This paper first examined the coastal law and policy applicable to 
marine renewable energy in the Bay of Fundy. It focused on the political 
arguments supporting the existing framework and on the legislative 
history of the Marine Renewable Energy Act, with a view to highlight a 
well-engrained issue-driven approach to ocean governance. The paper 
examined the marine renewable energy law and policy in light of the 
Fournier report to demonstrate a clear disconnect between enacted 
legislation and strong calls to develop integrated ocean management and 
spatial planning approaches. It showed that legal and policy decisions 
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impeding inclusive and spatially aware management were directly or 
indirectly shaped by jurisdictional considerations. The second part of the 
paper placed the emphasis on the Bay of Fundy’s geopolitical 
delimitations throughout history, demonstrating that jurisdictional 
hesitation has in fact developed out of ambiguities concerning domestic 
boundaries. The paper studied resource administration lines and marked 
that they added a layer of confusion while leaving unresolved the 
jurisdictional debate. It concluded with a brief assessment of the federal-
provincial arrangements in the oil and gas sector in what marks a full-
circle with the paper’s initial arguments on issue-driven, overly-cautious 
and jurisdictionally vague approaches to coastal management.  
 Uncertainty in jurisdiction is the most significant barrier to organized 
marine planning.165 Jurisdictional boundaries matter. They are especially 
relevant in view of current environmental challenges that require 
comprehensive approaches rather than issue-driven ones. Furthermore, 
technological developments and increasing offshore activity, namely 
related to marine renewable energy, make sustainable frameworks an 
urgent necessity.  Resolution of federal-provincial conflicts of jurisdiction 
through a judicial or political boundary delimitation in the Bay of Fundy 
is crucial to the integrated management of the bay’s uses and resources. 
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